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Introduction
In 1969, Ursula Le Guin's  The Left Hand of Darkness was published. The book, set on a 
planet where the androgynous inhabitants do not have categories such as “man” or “woman,” 
calls every character by male pronouns by default. This decision was controversial among 
certain critics.  Le Guin, in her own words, “eliminated gender, to find out what was left.  
Whatever was left would be, presumably,  simply human” (“Is Gender Necessary? Redux” 
160).  Male critics mostly lauded the book; Harold Bloom for example included it  in  The 
Western  Canon  as  one of  the  books which  have left  indelible  marks  on Western  literary 
culture. The culture surrounding science fiction literature was overwhelmingly male at the 
time. In that environment The Left Hand of Darkness won both the Hugo and Nebula awards 
for best science fiction novel. It was mostly women, mostly feminists, who were dismayed by 
how the  book  dealt  with  gender:  these  gender  politics  did  not  remove  gender  from the 
equation, they said, but they did remove women (Le Guin, “Winter's King” 93).
In  2013,  Ann  Leckie's  début  novel  Ancillary  Justice  was  published.  The 
narrator-protagonist  of  Leckie's  book  refers  to  every  character,  regardless  of  gender,  by 
female pronouns by default.  The book has been a success, winning the Hugo and Nebula 
awards as well as a host of other awards, most of which were not in existence when The Left  
Hand of Darkness was published. The culture of science fiction has grown since the sixties, 
both  in  size  and  diversity,  which  is  reflected  in  the  awards  the  book  received  or  was 
nominated for. The James Tiptree Jr. Award, which Ancillary Justice made it to the Honors 
List  for, awards “science fiction or fantasy that expands or explores our understanding of 
gender” (James Tiptree Jr.,  Literary Award Council,  “2013 Award Winner;” “Welcome”). 
Critics have lauded the book for its treatment of gender and androgyny. Meryl Trussler, who 
to my knowledge wrote the first academic work on  Ancillary Justice, considers the book's 
protagonist  to  provide  one  of  few “much-needed  models  for  non-binary  characters,”  i.e. 
characters  who do not fit  current  society's  two-gender template  (33). There has also been 
negative  criticism from other  feminists.  Alex  Dally  MacFarlane  laments  the  treatment  of 
gender in  Ancillary Justice as “out of date,” because she sees it as not much more than a 
reversal of what Le Guin did in The Left Hand of Darkness (MacFarlane, “Ancillary Justice”).
Ancillary Justice is indeed a reversal of The Left Hand of Darkness, but not just 
in the use of default single-gender pronouns. Fundamentally, what I will argue in this essay is 
that  The Left Hand of Darkness carries the message that everyone is whole, and  Ancillary  
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Justice,  in  reply,  carries  the  message  that  at  the  heart  of  everyone  is  not  wholeness,  but 
disunity.  I seek to explore the conversation that  Ancillary Justice is having with  The Left  
Hand  of  Darkness,  in  terms  of  androgyny,  gender,  and  identity.  My  writing  is  heavily 
informed by Nicholas Royle's 2003 monograph The Uncanny. I argue that The Left Hand of  
Darkness describes  a  journey  from  ignorance  to  understanding  through  empathy,  where 
androgyny is at first strange and disturbing – uncanny – but ends up being familiar and simply 
human. I argue further that  Ancillary Justice starts out with androgyny being familiar and 
human but ends with it being uncanny, and the source of this uncanniness is the very idea of 
gender. The books also differ in their use of telepathy as a plot device. In both books telepathy 
is used to explore the idea of wholeness and unity in identity. Ancillary Justice, however, lets 
telepathy fail, and exposes the disunity beneath.
The background section offers definitions of the philosophical and literary terms 
used in the analysis, as well as a contextualisation for where this essay fits within current 
literature and scholarship. Though elusiveness is one of its key traits, the uncanny will be 
defined as rigorously as possible within the allotted space. Three aspects of the uncanny will 
be identified at first. They will be used throughout the essay when discussing whether the 
uncanny is present or not in certain parts and passages of the books, and what causes the 
uncanny feeling. The second part of the essay details  The Left Hand of Darkness' structure 
and symbolism, which mimics the protagonist's expanding view of what is human. In the third 
part, the conversation between Ancillary Justice and The Left Hand of Darkness is described, 
in terms of the relationships between androgyny, gender, and the uncanny. Particular attention 
will  be paid to  the mechanics  of  the annexations  of  the Radch empire.  These mechanics 
contain  information  about  how gender  and androgyny function  in  the world of  Ancillary  
Justice. The last part returns briefly to theory to describe discourse on telepathy and identity 
in  literature  before  filling  in  the  rest  of  the  conversation  between  the  two books,  which 
depends on the question of telepathy and identity to be understood fully.
Background
The uncanny is queer. And the queer is uncanny. [emphasis in original] (Royle 43)
The above quote presents the main problem considered in the present study. The statement 
looks downright offensive. The uncanny is a concept closely related to unease and fear. It is 
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the feeling  that  something is  wrong,  especially  in  a way that  is  difficult  to  explain.  It  is 
perhaps “a foreign body within oneself, even the experience of oneself  as a foreign body” 
[emphasis in original] (Royle 2). The uncanny is often understood as an elusive, unplaceable 
wrongness. To apply the concept to a marginalized group of people such as queer people 
seems like more marginalization. To say that they are connected to this “foreign body” seems 
to  place  queerness  as  the  outlier,  abnormal  and  therefore  bad,  and  non-queerness  as  the 
default, normal and therefore good. At the same time, abnormality is whence queerness gets 
its  name.  Its  etymology  trails  from  a  meaning  of  “strange,  peculiar,  eccentric,”  to 
“homosexual” (Harper), to today's usage in queer studies where it also signifies something 
outside  society's  rigid,  binary  notions  of  gender  and  sexuality.  The  word  retains  its  old 
meanings, however, and it is true that queerness is often seen as frightening and foreign. The 
problem presented is, then, the question of whether queerness is uncanny by nature or whether 
current society merely presents it that way. The Left Hand of Darkness and Ancillary Justice 
answer that  question  in  two different  ways.  Both books handle  queerness  in  the  form of 
androgyny.  Using Royle's theories on literature and the uncanny, this essay will study this 
presentation of androgyny and its possible implications. To do that properly, a vocabulary of 
specialized terms will be provided and explained below, starting with the uncanny.
The seminal text in the study of the uncanny is Sigmund Freud's 1919 essay 
“The 'Uncanny,'”  written  in  German as  “Das Unheimliche.”  Freud's  essay lays  out  many 
aspects of the uncanny; three of these will be the focus of the present investigation. The first 
aspect under consideration comes from Ernst Jentsch, who equates the uncanny with a feeling 
of unfamiliarity and what Freud later calls “intellectual uncertainty” (Freud 221). Intellectual 
uncertainty  comes  from the  inability  to  properly  categorise  something;  it  is  a  failure  of 
categories. The second aspect comes from Friedrich Schelling, who explains the uncanny as 
everything which “ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light” (Freud 
225). It is things that are suppressed but bubble up again. The last aspect comes from Freud, 
and  it  is  often  used  as  the  definition  of  the  uncanny  itself.  It  is  “something  familiar 
unexpectedly  arising  in  a  strange  and  unfamiliar  context,  or  …  something  strange  and 
unfamiliar  unexpectedly  arising  in  a  familiar  context,”  for  “the  uncanny  is  that  class  of 
frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar” (Royle 1, Freud 220). 
The uncanny is a strange mixture of that which is familiar and that which is unfamiliar. These 
three aspects of the uncanny will be used throughout the essay to understand how and when 
uncanniness arises from a text.
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The uncanny is not just a Western concept, however. In Japan, the field that first 
considered the uncanny was robotics. In 1970, Masahiro Mori wrote a speculative essay titled 
“The  Uncanny  Valley”  for  a  small  magazine,  Energy (“The  Uncanny  Valley”  98).  As 
illustrated by figure 1 (Appendix), Mori hypothesises that robots that look imperfectly human 
are met with distrust and fright. Robots that look perfectly human or not very human at all  
avoid such a reaction. He also hypothesises about prosthetics and puppets, for the uncanny 
valley  is  not  limited  to  robots.  Because  Mori's  essay  was  written  in  Japanese  it  did  not 
consciously  link  itself  to  the  etymologies  of  the  Anglo-German  uncanny-unheimlich,  but 
Mori's speculations contain all three aspects of the uncanny given above. He writes about 
“distinguish[ing]”  prosthetics  from  flesh  (“The  Uncanny  Valley”  98).  Having  to  choose 
between  calling  something  flesh  or  metal  presumes  intellectual  uncertainty.  For  Mori, 
“creating an artificial human is the true goal of robotics” so much of robotics is about hiding 
the artificial nature of a robot (98). The uncanny valley is where this artificial nature, which 
ought to remain hidden, comes to light. The last aspect also exhibits itself in the dip in the 
graph,  because  it  seems  logical  that  something  that  looks  more  human  should  feel  more 
familiar and instead it feels unfamiliar. Mori's essay was largely forgotten until an English 
translation  was  presented  at  a  conference  in  2005,  after  which  it  has  “become  a  sort  of 
principle  in  the  robotics  field”  (Mori,  “An  Uncanny  Mind”  106).  Where  Freud  sees  an 
unpleasant emotion and tries to root out its causes, Mori sees an unpleasant effect and tries to 
develop strategies to minimize it. Mori's and Freud's essays describe the same thing, the same 
uncanniness, approached however from different cultures and disciplines. The uncanny is, if 
not universal, then culturally independent.
For  the  present  essay,  the  uncanny  valley  will  be  used  to  explain  certain 
reactions from characters, to understand how they categorize other characters as human or 
not. For instance, Genly treats the androgynes in The Left Hand of Darkness as if they are less 
than human. They seem to fall into the uncanny valley for him. The reader naturally feels with 
Genly, the effect of which is that they experience the androgynous Gethenians as Other. “The 
Other” is a concept used in philosophy and literature, especially postcolonial studies. It refers 
to people on the other side of an artificial divide between subject and object, a familiar us and 
an unfamiliar them, the Same and the Other. The point behind describing this artificial divide 
is  that  it  is artificial  and that the Other is  the Same,  despite  being subjected to Othering. 
“Othering” is a process, something done to someone to make them Other. The connection 
between Otherness and the uncanny has been noted by Julia Kristeva. She writes that Freud, 
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in his ruminations on the uncanny, invites us “[t]o discover our own disturbing [O]therness” 
(192). This disturbing Otherness is the “foreign object within oneself” that Royle writes about 
as well (2).
Is  queerness  then  uncanny?  Is  androgyny?  “Queer”  here  refers  to  virtually 
anything that questions the familiarity of heterosexuality, gender binarism (i.e. the idea that 
there are only two genders and that everyone slots easily into one of the two categories), and 
other norms to do with gender and sexuality. Queerness is often marginalized and Othered. As 
such,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  queerness  could  be  uncanny.  However,  it  comes  down  to 
presentation.  The Left  Hand of  Darkness presents,  at  first,  an  uncanny androgyny,  while 
Ancillary Justice does not. Androgyny presented in the right way might make people question 
whether  to choose male or female  pronouns for a person, or they might  stick to singular 
“they” and avoid the aspect of intellectual uncertainty. Androgyny might uncannily bring to 
light  uncomfortable  truths,  suspicions,  and  doubts  about  “one's  so-called  …  'sexuality'” 
(Royle 1), which ought to have remained hidden. Alternatively,  it  might just not.  For the 
aspect of the familiar in the unfamiliar, androgyny can be presented as the familiar elements 
of male and female remixed in an unfamiliar way, as in much of The Left Hand of Darkness. 
It can also be presented as an unremarkable part of life with nothing uncanny about it, as in 
Ancillary Justice.  The uncanniness of androgyny depends on a certain work's or a certain 
tradition's presentation of it.
The uncanniness of androgyny also comes down to interpretation. The present 
essay's interpretation of androgyny differs from much scholarly writing on the subject before. 
For  Kari  Weil,  whose  book  Androgyny  and  the  Denial  of  Sexual  Difference  traces  the 
trajectory of androgyny as an ideal  throughout Western history,  androgyny is  pervasively 
male and often “conservative, if not misogynistic” (2). Her contention is that androgyny is 
conceived of and used as feminized masculinity, in other words a way to ignore or eliminate  
women. Weil is cautiously optimistic about a future where the ideal of androgyny can be used 
to emancipate women, but she gives no thought to people whose identities fall outside the 
gender binary.  Weil  would agree with Brian Atterby,  who proposes that the two ways to 
handle androgyny in fiction are “approaching it from the masculine end of the spectrum [or] 
the feminine” (41). The direction of this approach depends on whether the author or character 
describing  the  androgyny  is  male  or  female  (41).  Atterby  does  note  that  androgynous 
characters such as Estraven in  The Left Hand of Darkness describe androgyny as well, but 
says they do so only “vacant[ly]” – the author behind the character determines the direction 
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then (45). Both Weil and Atterby interpret androgyny as supporting the gender binary instead 
of destabilizing it1.
Critical writing on androgyny often suffers from such a gender-binary frame of 
mind.  In  efforts  to  counter  the  Othering  of  women,  queer  and  non-binary  identities  are 
Othered and become invisible. Perhaps one reason why there is comparatively little written 
about  the  link  between the  uncanny and androgyny  has  to  do  with  this  process  wherein 
woman is first Othered and then absorbed into the Same. The figure of woman is still Other 
and this process is still ongoing, so scholarly attention has not been focused on other Others. 
To paraphrase  Judith  Butler:  one  has  to  be  considered  a  subject  to  be  represented  (1-2), 
meaning that queer androgynous people are not represented as subjects; instead they are used 
to buttress the gender binary.  In the present essay, androgyny will as much as possible be 
interpreted as something other than simple support for binary structures of gender. 
Wavering Definitions of Human in The Left Hand of Darkness
I'll make my report as if I told a story, for I was taught as a child on my homeworld that  
Truth is a matter of the imagination. The soundest fact may fail or prevail in the style of its  
telling: like that singular organic jewel of our seas, which grows brighter as one woman 
wears it and, worn by another, dulls and goes to dust. Facts are no more solid, coherent, 
round, and real than pearls are. But both are sensitive. (1)
This  opening  paragraph  of  The  Left  Hand  of  Darkness serves  two  significant  narrative 
functions. First, it is an uncanny unmooring of reality and a welcome to the fictive world. 
Kristeva remarks that “uncanniness occurs when the borders between imagination and reality  
are erased” [emphasis in original] (188). Here, those porous borders are blurred at least. Truth 
is in fiction, and fiction is in truth. The familiarity of the truth blends in with the unfamiliarity 
of the fiction. The aspect of osmosis between the familiar and the unfamiliar is shown in the 
blurring of borders, which also invites intellectual  uncertainty,  unplaceability.  If  the work 
contradicts itself, then it is not factual for Genly, the narrator, just as it is not a factual account 
for the reader who happens to know it was written as a story by Ursula Le Guin. Thus Genly, 
1Atterby does consider androgyny a tool for destabilization but cannot conceive of it in non-binary terms. The 
destabilization he conceives of is one of power, not of of the categories themselves. What Royle and Leckie are 
concerned with is a destabilization of the categories themselves.
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with the phrase “as if I told a story,” brings to light the fictional nature of the work without 
ever stating it outright.
Second, the opening paragraph hints at an adherence to gender roles in Genly's 
mind, such as the ones concerning women and jewellery or beauty.  On Earth, where both 
Genly and the reader come from, women are often valued and judged more on their looks than 
anything  else.  However,  women  seem absent  from the  book after  this  introduction.  Why 
evoke  an  image  of  women  when  they  are,  or  seem  to  be,  not  there?  Genly  describes 
Gethenians as women very few times in the book. Two of those times he is describing people 
who are lower than him in the social hierarchy and who he sees as womanly. They are people 
he has power over and who happen to fit his image of femininity. The first he thinks of “as 
[his] landlady, for he ha[s] fat buttocks … and a soft face, and prying, spying, ignoble, kindly 
nature” (39). The second is when someone presents himself sexually to him in an invitation to 
sex: “I saw a girl, a filthy, stupid, weary girl looking up into my face as she talked, smiling 
timidly, looking for solace” (139). This Gethenian has become hormonally female, as they do 
half the time they are sexually active, and Genly turns her down. The almost casual mention 
of  these gendered structures  in  the opening paragraph,  that  women are supposed to wear 
jewellery, is the beginning of these Earth-cultural biases.
After  the  pearl  analogy,  the  Gethenians'  uncanny  androgyny  and  the  sheer 
alienness  of  the  situation  is  introduced.  Genly  describes  King  Argaven  as  a  “king-bee,” 
echoing the more  standard phrase of “queen-bee” (4).  Such a  description exemplifies  the 
presentation of androgyny in the book, as it both blurs gender boundaries and erases the idea 
of women. Genly is then conscious of calling the androgynes male: “man I must say, having 
said  he and  his”  [emphasis  in  original]  (4).  Yet  for  all  his  conscious  attempts  at  seeing 
Estraven, councillor to the king, as male,  it  is because of his “soft  supple femininity that 
[Genly] dislike[s] and distrust[s]” him (10). For a while, Genly loses himself in intellectually 
uncertain thought: “it was impossible to think of him as a woman … yet whenever I thought 
of him as a man I felt a sense of falseness” (10). He does not understand his own disgust at the 
“effeminate deviousness” of Estraven (11). The word “effeminate” is especially telling here, 
because it connotes a feminized man. Genly has by his own admission superposed a gender 
binary on the way the Gethenians present themselves. It is apparent that, for him, Gethenians 
fall into something like the uncanny valley. When Estraven says to Genly that he is “the only 
man in all of Gethen that has trusted you entirely, and … the only man in Gethen that you 
have refused to trust” he is saying that he tried to meet Genly as an equal, as the Same (162). 
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It takes Genly some time to realize the weight of this: “[Estraven] was the only one who had 
entirely accepted [him] as a human being … and who therefore had demanded of [him] an 
equal degree of recognition” (202). It is partly because he strives to reach full human likeness 
that  Estraven falls  into the uncanny valley in Genly's  mind,  where he is  Other,  less than 
human.
Is is through the aforementioned Earth-cultural biases that this Othering of the 
androgynous persists. This Othering maintains the link between the uncanny and Gethenian 
androgyny. One scout admits this bias early on, saying that “the very use of the pronoun in 
my thoughts leads me continually to forget that the [Gethenian] I am with is not a man, but a 
manwoman”  (76).  She  admits  that  the  gender-binary  lens  through  which  Gethenians  are 
viewed has a profound effect on her perception of them. She also stays very aware of their 
status  as  Other  throughout  her  log.  She  opens  her  log  with  the  remark  that  Gethenian 
androgyny  must  be an “experiment”  conducted  by the  humans  who put  them there  (72). 
Androgyny, she claims, likely cannot occur naturally. It is therefore artificial and not lifelike 
enough. The Gethenian androgyny falls into something like the uncanny valley for this scout: 
“[t]he somer-kemmer cycle strikes us as degrading, a return to the estrus cycle of the lower 
mammals” (77). Their hormone cycles make them less human in her eyes. The Gethenians are 
thus reduced to their bodies and bodily functions for much of the book. Trussler writes on this 
method of Othering that the bodies of the Other are visible and “loaded with meanings” in a 
way that the Same's body is not (31). The Other's differences, especially bodily ones such as 
ethnicity,  are  always  highlighted  (32).  In  the  case  of  the  Gethenians,  the  nature  of  their 
androgyny is in focus. What the Other is different from is always invisible, obscure, and taken 
as default (31-32). For a large part of the book the androgynes of Gethen are presented as 
though there is something fundamentally wrong, inhuman, and uncanny with and about them.
Imagery  to  do  with  darkness  and  shadows  plays  a  large  part  in  painting 
Gethenians  as  uncanny  and  inhuman.  Genly  comments  on  the  Orgota  (inhabitants  of 
Orgoreyn, a country on Gethen) that it is “as if they did not cast shadows” (119). The image 
this  description evokes is  can be seen through all  three aspects  of  the uncanny.  There  is 
intellectual uncertainty in what that quote means; Genly says he does not understand his own 
metaphor (119). There is the aspect of the familiar and unfamiliar in how the man who sets 
off the “shadow” thought strikes Genly as “just a little bit unreal,” along with the rest of the 
Orgota (118). The unreal is seeping into the real. The thought also brings to light what is 
wrong with the Orgota, a thought Genly has been avoiding. It is part of a line of thought 
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which begins and ends in darkness and which runs through most of his stay in Orgoreyn. 
When he first enters the country he is taken to a “vast stone semi-cellar with one door locked 
on us from outside, and no window … perfectly dark” (89-90). Later he finds himself  in 
similar circumstances, “locked in the dark with uncomplaining,  unhopeful people,” and he 
understands  the  mistake  in  having  “ignored  that  black  cellar  and  gone  looking  for  the 
substance  of  Orgoreyn  above  ground,  in  daylight”  (136).  Their  “substance”  lies  in  the 
uncanny shadows. The Orgota are marked as inhuman and Other by the shadow imagery.
This shadow play runs through the whole book, and for most of it evokes the 
effect of reminding the reader of the Gethenians'  Otherness. In one chapter, “Estraven the 
Traitor,” the reader is presented with a legend filled with shadow imagery. It is hard to tell 
whether the Estraven of the story is the same Estraven that the reader already knows, or an 
uncanny double, or some ancestor. The introduction hints at a sort of antiquity: “Long ago, 
before the days of King Argaven I” (100). In the legend, “a Domain's pride is the length of its  
borders,  and the lords of Kerm Land are proud men and umbrageous men,  casting black 
shadows” (100). Here “umbrageous” seems to mean more than just its dictionary definition of 
affording shade. The issue of borders is bound up with the imagery of shadows; the moving of 
borders is suggested to influence the blackness of the shadows those men cast. The meaning 
of a shadow in this legend is, at this point, opaque to the reader. Such is the case in several 
stray comments throughout the novel as well. For example, the preparations for war between 
Karhide  and  Orgoreyn  are  described  as  a  “shadow-fight”  (65).  The  opacity  of  shadows, 
together  with the unclear  identity of the shadow Estraven,  lend themselves  to  intellectual 
uncertainty, an aspect of the uncanny. The aspect of familiarity and unfamiliarity is present 
when the word is used in a metaphor that is more understandable to the reader. In an earlier  
inserted legend,  for example,  it  is  said that  “murder  is  a lighter  shadow on a house than 
suicide,”  which  seems  to  use  “shadow” to  mean  something  like  “curse”  (19).  The  word 
“curse” is used earlier in the short legend as well, lending weight to this interpretation. The 
aspect of things brought to light is here the untranslatability of certain cultural expressions, 
the very alienness of Gethen to the reader and to Genly. The shadow imagery, in the parts of 
the book up until a certain point, marks all Gethenians as Other.
The shadows, however,  also contain the key to understanding the aliens  and 
removing their uncanniness. The Gethenian concept of “shifgrethor” aids in this dispelling. 
Shifgrethor is explained as “prestige, face, place, the pride-relationship, the untranslatable and 
all-important principle of social authority,” a kind of chivalric code, though it is untranslatable 
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(11). Shifgrethor includes a system of rules for behaviour, which can be “played” at several 
levels (86, passim). For example, it is used to play at politics, where kings and politicians 
have to obey certain rules lest they lose face. Gethenians can also “waive shifgrethor” when 
they want to talk more directly (69, passim). Though it remains an elusive concept. After two 
years on-planet, Genly has “never even really understood the meaning of the word” (202). 
Estraven  replies:  “It  comes  from  an  old  word  for  shadow”  (202).  Thus  the  imagery  of 
shadows in the legends and in Genly's speculations connects itself to the Gethenian code of 
honour,  and several  cryptic  passages  can be decrypted.  The “black shadows” cast  by the 
“proud … umbrageous men” in the legend of Estraven the Traitor can now be understood as 
illustrations of great prestige or strong morals (100). In the other legend, the phrasing “murder 
is a lighter shadow on a house than suicide” suggests that someone's suicide, which is more 
taboo than murder, would perhaps be more visible in the shadow, shifgrethor, of a family. The 
shifgrethor reveal brings the uncanniness of the shadows to light.
After the shifgrethor reveal, the shadow imagery serves the function of taking 
uncanniness away instead. After the reveal, Genly teaches Estraven telepathy, and they enter 
weather  conditions  called  “the  Unshadow”  (213). With  telepathy,  “there's  no  lying” 
intentionally (206). The condition of being unable to lie is represented symbolically in the 
Unshadow, where “neither [Estraven] nor [Genly] cast any shadow”  (212), which echoes the 
waiving of shifgrethor to allow people to speak frankly from earlier in the novel. After the 
Unshadow, phrases such as “[t]he king shortens no man's shadow” appear with a clarity they 
did not possess before (222). Even Genly uses the phrase “[s]ome shadows got shorter and 
some longer, as they say in Karhide” in the narration (234). The shadows are not uncanny 
now, as there is no intellectual uncertainty about them, and nothing more to bring to light. The 
shifgrethor reveal is also part of the process of making androgyny no longer uncanny. This 
process uses the same imagery of light and darkness:
Light is the left hand of darkness
and darkness the right hand of light.
Two are one, life and death, lying
together like lovers in kemmer,
like hands joined together,
like the end and the way. (190)
This song, sung by Estraven, is perhaps the start of the process that dispels the uncanny. The 
song lends the book its title, which is proof of its significance. Genly connects the song to to 
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the yin-yang symbol, and draws it in a notebook. He shows the symbol to Estraven and says 
what it represents is “[l]ight, dark. Fear, courage. Cold, warmth. Female, male. It is yourself, 
[Estraven]. Both and one. A shadow on snow” (217). The shadow imagery thus becomes a 
symbol for the wholeness in Estraven's being, in that his androgynous body can incorporate 
both maleness and femaleness. Genly could not accept this premise at the outset of the novel, 
but now his definition of what a human is has expanded. Estraven is no longer in the uncanny 
valley for Genly. At the same time, the yin-yang drawing also symbolises how the Gethenians 
are part of the species of humanity in a less personal way. Not long after this scene, Gethen 
joins the Ekumen, the collection of all human planets for which Genly is an Envoy. Genly 
says that the symbol is found on more planets than just Earth (217). The song and the symbol 
represent the same fundamental human nature, so Gethen and the Ekumen are the Same. The 
Other has become the Same and the artificial divide between them has been scrubbed out. 
None of the Gethenians have changed in nature, however. The only one who has changed is 
Genly,  who  has  come  to  accept  the  Gethenians  as  the  Same.  The  uncanniness  of  the 
androgynes was, it seems, just culture shock.
The Machinery of the Empire in Ancillary Justice
Ancillary Justice starts out with an already expanded view of humanity, in which everyone is 
the Same, or at least Sameish. The narrator and main character, Breq, at one point notes that 
the group “nonhumans … include[s] quite a number of people who [consider] themselves 
human,”  but  her  narration  always  treats  people  as  fully  human  (102).  Indeed,  the  book 
comments  quite  actively  on  Othering  and  dehumanisation.  One  character,  Skaaiat  Awer, 
mentions that “it's so easy, isn't it, to decide the people you're fighting aren't really human” 
(323-324). Much of the book makes the reader aware of the artificial divide between Same 
and Other. For instance, in the language of the empire, Radchaai, the word for a Radch citizen 
and “civilized” are the same word (62). Therefore anyone who is not a citizen of the empire is  
uncivilized. Similarly, Breq speaks Radhcaai as her first language, a language which “doesn't 
mark gender in any way” (3). Therefore she often chooses the wrong gender for people when 
she is  in places that  do mark gender in their  language.  Though callousness and disregard 
might be expected since she comes from the Radch, she handles gendered terms more like a 
confused tourist  than  someone  who disrespects  the  traditions.  She  may be frustrated  that 
people are “invariably … offended when [she] hesitate[s] or guess[es] wrong” (77), but she 
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never reduces someone to their bodily attributes. Breq's narration never seems to treat anyone 
as Other. Perhaps Breq never treats anyone as Other because at heart she is Other herself. 
Whether a character is androgynous or explicitly binary-gendered, they are presented as fully 
human and Same.
As a result of Breq's Otherness, the uncanny feelings arising from this book are 
felt mainly by the reader. The proper pronoun for machine intelligences such as Breq in the 
Radch are “it” and “its,” as evidenced whenever they talk about ships or ancillaries in the 
third  person (18,  passim).  She is  here  described with  female  pronouns partly  for  ease of 
reading.  Several  times  throughout  the  book she  proclaims  herself  to  not  be  “any sort  of 
individual,” “person,” or even “human,” (153, 144, 4). She is an outsider even in the Radch 
empire, and she is an outsider to every culture she encounters. She is uncanny, too, though not 
always in the reader's eyes, since the reader sees through Breq's eyes. The children on the 
planet Shis'urna call  her  a “corpse soldier” (22). She is one machine intelligence in many 
bodies, frozen bodies revived to serve as soldiers in the annexation.  All her bodies are in 
communication using telepathy. There is intellectual uncertainty when one child accuses her 
of being someone else because the child is used to talking to another body of hers (22-23). 
There  is  a  commingling  of  the  familiar  and the  unfamiliar  in  the  way she  is  a  machine 
consciousness, a foreign mind, in human bodies. The aspect of that which is brought to light is 
also present in how she is a reminder of the violence of an annexation. For most of the book 
this uncanniness is under the surface, however, and only emerges as a reading effect when one 
pays close attention or rereads a passage. In The Left Hand of Darkness the uncanny operates 
by feeling with the narrator; in Ancillary Justice it emerges as an effect of reading by feeling 
something apart from the narrator, as a reader, or with a character whose point of view is not 
shown.
Androgyny and the uncanny are, then, presented in different ways in Ancillary  
Justice than  they  are  in  The Left  Hand  of  Darkness.  In  The  Left  Hand of  Darkness  the 
androgyny is a removal of gender, and therefore a removal of gender roles entirely. The book 
therefore conforms to Butler's idea of gender, not just gender roles, as socially perpetuated. 
For Butler, and for Le Guin's world, gender and gender roles are synonymous, and one cannot 
exist  without  the other.  In the Radch empire,  on the other hand, the androgynes  do have 
gender. The first Radchaai the reader introduced to is Seivarden, who is male (4). That they 
should not have any gender, or be all the same gender, in the Radch empire is apparently a 
common  misperception.  In  one  scene  Strigan  says  she  “used  to  wonder  how  Radchaai 
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reproduced, if they were all the same gender,” to which Breq replies: “They're not” (104). 
MacFarlane  argues  that  Ancillary  Justice “inadvertently  genders”  all  the  supposedly  non-
gendered characters, making the same mistake as  The Left Hand of Darkness (MacFarlane, 
“Post-Binary Gender in SF: Ancillary Justice”). As Breq says, they do have gender, and they 
are  not  all  the  same  gender.  Their  system  of  gender  seems  simply  to  be  invisible  or 
indiscernible. For instance, when Breq reaches Omaugh Palace, she sees
them all, suddenly, for just a moment, through non-Radchaai eyes, an eddying crowd of 
unnervingly ambiguously gendered people. I saw all the features that would mark gender 
for non-Radchaai … Short hair or long, worn unbound (trailing down a back, or in a thick, 
curled  nimbus)  or  bound (braided,  pinned,  tied).  Thick-bodied  or  thin-,  faces  delicate-
featured or coarse-, with cosmetics or none. A profusion of colors that would have been 
gender-marked in other places. All of this matched randomly with bodies curving at breast  
and hip or not, bodies that one moment moved in ways various non-Radchaai would call 
feminine, the next moment masculine. (283)
The gender of Radchaai is not a social function, but a private, idiosyncratic thing. When these 
gender expressions are presented to other cultures, such as modern day Earth, they look like 
and for the most part act indistinguishably from an expression of androgyny.
The lens  through which the reader  sees  Ancillary  Justice is  the unavoidably 
gendered one of English. In English, the use of male pronouns as default is still the default, as 
it was in the sixties. The defaultness of the male is prominent in more than just gendered 
pronouns; the default image associated with a word such as “captain” is male, for example. 
One of  the  more  lasting  criticisms  against  The Left  Hand of  Darkness  has  been  that,  in 
addition  to  defaulting  to  the  male  pronoun,  the  story  “cast[s]  the  Gethenian  protagonist, 
Estraven,  almost  exclusively  into  roles  that  we  are  culturally  conditioned  to  perceive  as 
'male'” (Le Guin, “Is Gender Necessary? Redux” 170). Ancillary Justice, by using the female 
pronouns as default, is inherently more disruptive than Le Guin's book. However, other parts 
of the Radch culture are gendered just as, for want of a better word, normal. Typically female 
roles such as those in the sphere of the family are all denoted with the female version of the 
word: “mother,” “daughter,” “sister,” and so on (69, 312, 378, passim). In the Radch military, 
characters say “sir” to their superiors (172, passim). The gendering of different spheres serves 
as a comment on the inescapable nature of gender in the current language and culture. This 
gendering also serves another, less obvious function: saying “parent” instead of mother or 
father would sound alien, and gendering the term avoids that. But even if Leckie had written 
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“parent,” and avoided terms like “sir,” the book would still be written in English. As noted 
above, the word “captain” still  conjures up an image of a man for most English-speaking 
readers. The reader is obligated to see the story through the gendered lens of modern day 
English, and can therefore not escape it.
There must be a constant influx of new gender, or gender expressions, in Radch 
culture  due to  the annexations,  making gender  somewhat  unstable.  The empire,  being an 
empire, is constantly expanding their culture by way of annexations. It is mentioned that in 
the aftermath of an annexation, it takes “a generation or two” for annexed people to become 
fully Radchaai (147). It can be assumed that they get to keep their gender expressions more or 
less intact, as they can still talk their own languages; the invading forces even learn the local 
languages (62). They also keep their religions more or less intact, evidenced by the character 
who is “the head priest of Ikkt,” a character who is given a lot of leeway to decide what to do 
with the religion in the city of Ors (43). At the time of the events in Ors she has “not seen her 
way clear to demoting her god in its own temple,  or identifying Ikkt with Amaat closely 
enough to add Radchaai rites to her own” (43). Amaat is the supreme god of the Radchaai, but 
it  is  “normal  practice to absorb any religion the Radch ran across,  to fit  its  gods into an 
already blindingly complex genealogy, or to say merely that the supreme, creator deity was 
Amaat  under another  name and let  the rest  sort  themselves  out” (175). When a Radchaai 
encounters a new god, she “ma[kes] the strange god familiar and br[ings] it safely within her 
mental framework” (262). The cultural assimilation seems to work by the same principles in 
several levels of society. As Skaaiat Awer says about their way of maintaining power: “we go 
to the top of the local hierarchy” to make deals, letting the other elements in that structure sort 
themselves out underneath (147). She is describing legal power, but the quote can be easily 
applied to the way they spread their religion as well. Therefore it can also be extended to how 
gender expressions and norms are absorbed and handled by the Radch. Gender is unstable 
because of the constant influx of new gender expressions from annexed culture, but the Radch 
androgyny is always placed on top of such expressions, and given priority.
Gender  haunts  this  novel.  The  role  of  gender  is  suppressed  and  uncanny 
throughout  the  book.  Consider  one  more  example  of  the  pattern  of  power  and  cultural 
structures in the book: the perhaps most uncanny scene in the book, when Breq gets a new 
body. At first, she has “no control over the new body” (171). Presumably,  the person who 
used to be this body has a gender, but this gets replaced by the “it” of robot intelligence (or of 
dead meat) before the person goes away. Then both “I” and “it” are used the body: “'Help,' I 
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croaked … It was shivering, still cold from suspension, and from terror” (171). Borders are 
blurred here and it is impossible to say where Breq ends and the original consciousness of the 
body begins, displaying the aspect of intellectual uncertainty. The familiarity of one identity 
mixes with the unfamiliarity of another, another aspect of the uncanny. At an earlier juncture 
in the book, twenty years after this scene chronologically, Strigan says to Breq “I can bring 
you back” [emphasis in original], referring to the person underneath (135). The person does 
not go away. They are brought to light here, but Breq does what she can to keep them hidden. 
This structure of the suppressed gender is reflected in the switch of pronoun from “he” or 
“she” to “it,” and in the uncanniness of the situation. Every body that Breq inhabits has been 
someone else before, before they get deleted. For Radch and in Radch, gender is nothing but 
uncanny.
Unifying, Disunifying Telepathy
Telepathy is uncanny and highly present in both  The Left Hand of Darkness  and  Ancillary  
Justice.  Royle  argues  that  the  growth  of  technology  has  made  telepathy  more  and  more 
prominent in the modern era (192). Therefore, the word telepathy will here be extended to 
machine communications (such as wireless signals) that are connected to telepathy, like the 
ansible below. Royle writes on telepathy obsessively. On the subject of Salman Rushdie's 
1981 novel  Midnight's Children, he writes that it uses telepathy to explore “the notion that 
any given moment … depends on the fiction that everyone is experiencing the same moment, 
uncannily interconnected, sharing the same 'now'” [emphasis in original] (270). This notion is 
a  “fiction,”  which  means  that  it  is  both  literary  and  false.  Its  falseness  is  here  taken  as 
axiomatic2. This notion is closely related to the narratological idea of an omniscient third-
person narrator. This style of narrator is called omniscient in “presumed analogy between the 
novelist as creator and the Creator of the cosmos, an omniscient God” (Scholes and Kellogg 
272). This analogy is insufficient if not false for Scholes and Kellogg, as it is for Royle. The 
analogy  depends  on  that  illusion  of  unity,  but  “God  knows everything  because  He  is 
everywhere  –  simultaneously  …  [a  narrator]  does  not  'know'  simultaneously  but 
consecutively” [emphasis in original] (Scholes and Kellogg 272). A novel presents a story, 
not an instantaneous chunk of information, so it cannot be told omnisciently. Furthermore, a 
2One can, however, ground it in an understanding of Einsteinian relativity where things that accelerate 
differently age differently. Confer with the “twin paradox” for a short explanation. 
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story can contradict  itself  in ways that  information acquired by omniscience,  presumably, 
cannot. Royle prefers the term “telepathic” or “clairvoyant” to describe such a consecutively,  
uncannily knowing narrator (259, passim).  Telepathy can disrupt the illusion of unity,  the 
fiction  of  the “same 'now,'” because  it  can be an Othering of  the self.  Telepathy can let 
someone else – someone Other – into one's skull and give them full agency. That way the 
telepath knows that  everyone is  not experiencing the same moment.  Writing a story with 
telepathy forces the story to handle that revelation or to suppress it.
The idea of a same “now,” or something much like it, is present in  The Left  
Hand of Darkness. It is given the name “the constant of simultaneity” (30). Genly Ai brings to 
Gethen  both  the  ansible,  a  machine  which  “produce[s]  a  message  at  any  two  points 
simultaneously”  and telepathy (30). The two are part of the same cultural  package.  Genly 
comments that “[m]indspeech [is] the only thing I ha[ve] to give to Estraven, out of all my 
civilization” (201). At the same time, the only trade the Ekumen can offer Gethen “consists 
largely of simple communication [via ansible] rather than of transportation” (111-112). The 
ansible and telepathy are interconnected. The principle of the ansible, of one message in two 
places instantaneously, seems to also be the principle of telepathy. Moreover, Telepathy is a 
key factor in the shift in Genly's view of humanity. When he lets Estraven into his head all 
Estraven's Otherness is dispelled: “the rapport [is] there” and Genly can see things through 
Estraven's eyes for the first time (207). The pattern of the Other appearing in the mind of the 
Same is also apparent in the larger scale, where the Ekumen accept Gethen into their midst. 
All communication with the Ekumen has to be through ansible, machine telepathy. The fiction 
of the same “now” is thus a fact in The Left Hand of Darkness, and a key to Genly's character 
growth as well as the structure of the whole story. In this book, telepathy is connected to the 
same  “now.”  Telepathy  here  is  unifying,  because  the  notion  of  the  same  “now”  is  not 
challenged.
In The Left Hand of Darkness, the idea of the same “now” is also connected to 
the illusion of a unified identity.  On this subject Royle writes “identity is never absolutely 
pure or singular” (271). Again, the falsehood or illusoriness of this notion is here taken as 
axiomatic. It does not matter for the analysis whether it is an illusion or not. Only the way it is 
presented,  as  either  a  fact  or  an  illusion,  matters.  The  Left  Hand  of  Darkness presents 
wholeness of identity as a truth that Genly figures out. The reader is presented with two facets 
of Estraven, and they at first do not seem to match up at all. As noted before, it seems as 
though Estraven the traitor, exiled from Karhide, who vexes and helps Genly, has a double or 
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an ancestor in the Estraven of the legend “Estraven the Traitor.” The truth of the matter is that  
Estraven is exiled as a traitor twice, once from Estre and once from Karhide. When Genly 
teaches Estraven telepathy, Estraven hears Genly's voice “as a dead man's, his brother's voice” 
(208). That voice explicitly connects Estraven to the Estraven in the legend. Even if the reader 
does not suspect a doppelgänger or ancestor, all the different facets of Estraven are present in 
this scene. He is unified and whole. Because of that voice, however, Estraven is “disturbed” 
by telepathy (207). Genly speculates that “[p]erhaps a Gethenian, being singularly complete, 
feels telepathic speech as a violation of completeness” (207). The fact of the same “now” 
comes up against the idea of a unified identity and disturbs it, not because the unified identity 
is  false  but  because  it  is  true.  The  completeness  would  not  be  violated  if  it  was  not  a 
completeness. Both notions are presented as truths, and Estraven is no longer Other in Genly's 
eyes, thanks to telepathy.
There is a large difference between the telepathy in The Left Hand of Darkness  
and the telepathy in  Ancillary Justice. At times in the latter's narrative, Breq is a telepathic 
first-person narrator. She knows her officers' “every breath, every twitch of every muscle,” 
but the kind of data she receives from them is only “very nearly” mind-reading (9, 289). 
Someone whose mind she can read, however, is herself. With her many bodies, she has to be 
in constant self-communication, though each of her bodies functions as full representations of 
her. The telepathy works by some form of technological communications system rather than 
the  apparent  instantaneous  transmission  in  The  Left  Hand  of  Darkness.  This  delay  in 
information  exchanges  between  different  subnodes  of  the  so-called  same  person  is  more 
obvious in Anaander Mianaai, the Lord of the Radch, who “possesse[s] thousands of bodies, 
all of them genetically identical, all of them linked to each other” all over the parts of the 
galaxy she rules (95).  So one part  of Anaander Mianaai  will  never  know everything that 
Anaander Mianaai knows. This inherent delay becomes a crucial plot point in the scene at 
Omaugh Palace. Breq reveals to Anaander Mianaai what she has been hiding from herself,  
that she is at war with herself: “She's been secretly moving against herself … the whole time 
all of her has been pretending not to know it was happening, because as soon as she admitted 
it the conflict  would be in the open, and unavoidable” (336-337). After Breq reveals this, 
Anaander  Mianaai  shuts  down  the  communications  between  her  bodies  to  “prevent  the 
knowledge from reaching the parts of her that aren't [t]here” (340). In two previous scenes the 
same type of device is used to cut off all wireless communications, and Breq is cut off from 
herself. In the first one, her individual segments sort out a system among themselves so they 
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can function somewhat efficiently at  least.  Only a few of them get to perform their  most 
important task of guarding an officer, “and the rest would have to trust that” (114). When 
telepathy goes away, the fiction of unity in their identity, which has to be connected to the 
fiction of the interconnected “now,” evaporates.
The communications shutdown in the Omaugh Palace throws into sharp relief 
what it ought to have hid, what ought to have remained hidden from/for Anaander Mianaai: 
her disunity. Breq notes that Mianaai deals with herself in shadows, “hiding what she'[s] done 
from herself,” never making an open move (361). Breq also asks the question “if there [are]  
now two Anaander Mianaais, might there not also be more?” (268). Anaander Mianaai also 
uses the illusion of unity in her identity to hide from her own disunity, even when she openly 
admits she is split. The explanation for these circumstances become that the side of herself 
that this side is against has been “[c]orrupted” by the Presger (214). Thus she becomes the 
true self and her disunity is due to infiltration rather than an honest disagreement with herself. 
The Presger have not in fact corrupted her: “No-one is subverting the Lord of Radch except 
the Lord of the Radch” (354). She is at war with herself; she is Other to herself. When she 
shuts down communications in Omaugh Palace, she is doing it so that the information that has 
come out in the open cannot reach her bodies outside the Palace. She fails, of course. At any 
moment, as with Breq, the Otherness in Anaander Mianaai is barely held at bay by a WiFi 
kind of telepathy. When Breq exposes the Lord of the Radch to her own disunity, the empire 
is  cracked in  two. It  was always  split  in  two, but now the Otherness within the Same is 
exposed and open.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this essay suggests that the message of The Left Hand of Darkness  
is, if a singular one can be extracted, that the Other is the Same. The artificial divide between 
Same and Other is  exposed to light  and removed during the course of the book. Though 
androgynous  characters  are  first  presented  as  uncanny  and  somehow  inhuman,  they  are 
vindicated, and Genly comes to understand them as whole and fully human. His journey of 
learning to empathise with the Gethenian mindset, of learning to realise their Sameness, is 
reflected in what emerges as uncanny throughout the book. At first the Gethenian androgyny 
is uncanny, as Genly cannot fit his gender binarism onto them. The journey ends with Genly 
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accepting the Gethenians as menwomen rather than men without women. His understanding is 
aided by the telepathy between him and Estraven.
Conversely, Ancillary Justice seems to carry a message that wants to expose the 
Otherness within the Same, the foreign body within the self. The uncanny is always present in 
the novel, but it seems subsurface, hidden, for most of it. There is no character growth that 
mirrors Genly's in  Ancillary Justice, just an exposure. Anaander Mianaai is brought face to 
face  with  her  own  disunity  and  forced  to  confront  it.  The  implication  seems  to  be  that 
everyone, at heart, is disunified, and no-one is whole.
It seems that Ancillary Justice picks up themes and ideas where The Left Hand 
of  Darkness left  them,  attempting  to  incorporate  more  than  forty  years  of  expanding 
understandings of gender and queerness into one story. The understanding that gender can be 
and  is  uncanny  opens  up  Ancillary  Justice  to  deeper  analysis,  and  the  idea  of  telepathy 
disguising a disunified identity does the same. The two ideas are different expressions of the 
same thing, in fact. In current society, gender places a person in one social group instead of 
other(s), and unites them with the others of that group. In Radch, gender is a private matter, 
and chaotic. Telepathy unifies a person with themselves, or seems to, but when it goes away 
the disunity beneath is obvious. Disunity is seen in Ancillary Justice to be a more natural or 
obvious state of affairs than unity, and unity is often presented as self-deception.
More analysis on the effects of the choice of single-gender pronouns as default, 
and  the  uncanny  role  of  gender  in  Ancillary  Justice  would  be  welcome.  Perhaps  more 
criticism is  needed  on the  subject  of  the  conversation  between  it  and  The Left  Hand of  
Darkness as well. It is good when literary critics turn to works from contemporary culture and 
treat them with as much respect as the old, canonic works.
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Appendix
Fig. 1: Mori's graph of the uncanny valley, as translated and simplified by Karl MacDorman. 
As a robot approaches perfect human likeness, it risks falling into the uncanny valley and be 
regarded as unfamiliar, unheimlich.
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